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Abstract: Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs) are leaving the confines
of research laboratories, to find place in real-world deployments. Outside spe-
cialized domains (military, vehicular, etc.), city-wide community-networks are
emerging, connecting regular Internet users with each other, and with the In-
ternet, via MANETs. Growing to encompass more than a handful of “trusted
participants”, the question of preserving the MANET network connectivity,
even when faced with careless or malicious participants, arises, and must be
addressed.
A first step towards protecting a MANET is to analyze the vulnerabilities
of the routing protocol, managing the connectivity. By understanding how the
algorithms of the routing protocol operate, and how these can be exploited by
those with ill intent, countermeasures can be developed, readying MANETs for
wider deployment and use.
This paper takes an abstract look at the algorithms that constitute the
Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2 (OLSRv2), and identifies for
each protocol element the possible vulnerabilities and attacks – in a certain way,
provides a “cookbook” for how to best attack an operational OLSRv2 network,
or for how to proceed with developing protective countermeasures against these
attacks.
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Analyse de vulne´rabilite´ du protocol de routage
Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version
2 (OLSRv2)
Re´sume´ : Les re´seaux mobiles MANETs (Mobile Ad hoc NETworks) sortent
des laboratoires de recherche pour eˆtre de´ploye´s dans le monde re´el. Outre
les applications spe´cilise´es (militaires, ve´hiculaires etc.), des re´seaux commu-
nautaires urbains e´mergent pour connecter des simples utilisateurs d’Internet
a` d’autres utilisateurs et a` Internet via MANETs. Pour supporter un nombre
croissant d’utilisateurs au-dela` d’une poigne´e de participants de confiance, la
question de pre´server la connectivite´ des re´seaux MANET face a` des utilisa-
teurs imprudents ou malicieux se pose.
Un premier pas vers la protection de MANET est d’analyser les vulne´rabilite´s
du protocole de routage qui ge`re la connectivite´. En comprenant en profondeur
comment les algorithmes du protocole de routage ope`rent et comment ils peuvent
eˆtre exploite´s par des utilisateurs inde´licats, des contre-mesures peuvent eˆtre
de´veloppe´es afin de rendre MANET preˆt a` eˆtre de´ploye´ a` plus grande e´chelle.
Ce rapport examine de manie`re conceptuelle les algorithmes qui constituent
le protocole OLSRv2 (Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2) et pour
chaque e´le´ment du protocole identifie les e´ventuelles vulne´rabilite´s et attaques
possibles. En quelque sorte, le rapport procure un manuel sur la meilleure fac¸on
d’attaquer un re´seau OLSRv2 ope´rationnel, mais aussi sur les me´thodes pour
de´velopper les contre-mesures pour se prote´ger de ces attaques.
Mots-cle´s : OLSRv2, MANET, analyse de vulne´rabilite´, se´curite´
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1 Introduction
OLSRv2 (the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2) [10], [9], [11],
[12], [13] is a successor to the widely deployed OLSR [7] routing protocol for
MANETs (Mobile Ad hoc NETworks). OLSRv2 retains the same basic algo-
rithms as its predecessor, however offers various improvements, e.g. a modular
and flexible architecture allowing extensions, such as for security, to be devel-
oped as add-ons to the basic protocol.
The developments reflected in OLSRv2 have been motivated by increased
real-world deployment experiences, e.g. from networks such as FunkFeuer [14],
and the requirements presented for continued successful operation of these net-
works. With participation in such networks increasing (the FunkFeuer commu-
nity network has, e.g., roughly 400 individual participants), operating with the
assumption, that participants can be “trusted” to behave in a non-destructive
way, is utopia. Taking the Internet as an example, as participation in the net-
work increases and becomes more diverse, more efforts are required to preserve
the integrity and operation of the network. Most SMTP-servers were, e.g., ini-
tially available for use by all and sundry on the Internet – with an increased
populace on the Internet, the recommended practice is to require authentication
and accounting for users of such SMTP servers [8].
A first step towards hardening against attacks disrupting the connectivity of
a network, is to understand the vulnerabilities of routing protocol, managing the
connectivity. This paper therefore analyzes OLSRv2, to understand its inherent
vulnerabilities and resiliences. The authors do not claim completeness of the
analysis, but hope that the identified attacks as presented form a meaningful
starting-point for OLSRv2 security.
1.1 OLSRv2 Overview
OLSRv2 contains three basic processes: Neighborhood Discovery, MPR Flood-
ing and Link State Advertisements.
1.1.1 Neighborhood Discovery
The process, whereby each router discovers the routers which are in direct com-
munication range of itself (1-hop neighbors), and detects with which of these it
can establish bi-directional communication. Each router sends HELLOs, listing
the identifiers of all the routers from which it has recently received a HELLO,
as well as the “status” of the link (heard, verified bi-directional). A router a
receiving a HELLO from a neighbor b in which b indicates to have recently
received a HELLO from a considers the link a-b to be bi-directional. As b lists
identifiers of all its neighbors in its HELLO, a learns the “neighbors of its neigh-
bors” (2-hop neighbors) through this process. HELLOs are sent periodically,
however certain events may trigger non-periodic HELLOs.
1.1.2 MPR Flooding
The process whereby each router is able to, efficiently, conduct network-wide
broadcasts. Each router designates, from among its bi-directional neighbors, a
subset (MPR set) such that a message transmitted by the router and relayed by
RR n° 7203
4 T. Clausen, U. Herberg
the MPR set is received by all its 2-hop neighbors. MPR selection is encoded
in outgoing HELLOs. The set of routers having selected a given router as MPR
is the MPR-selector-set of that router. A study of the MPR flooding algorithm
can be found in [3].
1.1.3 Link State Advertisement
The process whereby routers are determining which link state information to
advertise through the network. Each router must advertise links between itself
and its MPR-selector-set, in order to allow all routers to calculate shortest
paths. Such ink state advertisements are carried in TC messages, are broadcast
through the network using the MPR Flooding process. As a router selects
MPRs only from among bi-directional neighbors, links advertised in TC are
also bi-directional. TC messages are sent periodically, however certain events
may trigger non-periodic TCs.
1.2 Link State Vulnerability Taxonomy
Proper functioning of OLSRv2 assumes that (i) each router can acquire and
maintain a topology map, accurately reflecting the effective network topology;
and (ii) that the network converges, i.e. that all routers in the network will have
sufficiently identical topology maps. An OLSRv2 network can be disrupted by
breaking either of these assumptions, specifically (a) routers may be prevented
from acquiring a topology map of the network; (b) routers may acquire a topol-
ogy map, which does not reflect the effective network topology; and (c) two or
more routers may acquire inconsistent topology maps.
1.3 OLSRv2 Attack Vectors
Besides “radio jamming”, attacks on OLSRv2 consist of a malicious router in-
jecting “correctly looking, but invalid, control traffic” (TCs, HELLOs) into the
network. A malicious router can either (a) lie about itself (its ID, its willingness
to serve as MPR), henceforth Identity Spoofing or (b) lie about its relationship
to other routers (pretend existence of links to other routers), henceforth Link
Spoofing. Such attacks will in-fine cause disruption in the Link State Advertise-
ment process, through targeting the MPR Flooding mechanism, or by causing
incorrect link state information to be included in TCs, causing routers to have
incomplete, inaccurate or inconsistent topology maps. In a different class of
attacks, a malicious router injects control traffic, tuned to cause an in-router
resource exhaustion, e.g. by causing the algorithms calculating routing tables
or MPR sets to be invoked continuously, preventing the internal state of the
router from converging.
1.4 Paper Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2, 3, and 4 each
represents a class of disruptive attacks against OLSRv2, detailing a number of
attacks in each class. Section 5 summarizes the identified vulnerabilities in an
OLSRv2 network, and section 6 summarizes the ways OLSRv2 has inherent
resilience to. The paper is concluded in section 7.
INRIA
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2 Topology Map Acquisition
Topology Map Acquisition relates to the ability for a – any – given router in
the network to acquire a representation of the network connectivity. A router,
unable to acquire a topology map, is incapable of calculating routing paths and
participating in forwarding data. Topology map acquisition can be hindered by
(a) TC messages to not being delivered to (all) routers in the network, such as
what happens in case of Flooding Disruption, or (b) in case of “jamming” of
the communication channel.
2.1 Flooding Disruption
MPR selection (section 1.1.2) uses information about a router’s 1-hop and 2-
hop neighborhood, assuming that (i) this information is accurate, and (ii) all
1-hop neighbors are equally apt as MPR. Thus, a malicious router will seek to
manipulate the 1-hop and 2-hop neighborhood information in a router such as
to cause the MPR selection to fail.
2.1.1 Flooding Disruption due to Identity Spoofing
In figure 1, a malicious router X spoofs the identity of b. The link between X
and c is correctly detected and listed in X’s HELLOs. a will receive HELLOs
indicating a links, respectively b:{ b-e }, X:{ X-c, X-e }, and d:{ d-e, d-c }. For
a, X and d are equal candidates for MPR selection.
e
b
cd
Xa
spoofs b
Figure 1: Identity Spoofing: The malicious router spoofs address of router b.
If b and X (i) accept MPR selection and (ii) forward flooded traffic as-
if they were both b, identity spoofing by X is harmless. If X does not forward
flooded traffic (i.e. does not accept MPR selection), its presence entails flooding
disruption: selecting b over d renders c unreachable by flooded traffic.
cb
d
xX a
spoofs x
Figure 2: Identity Spoofing: flooding attach: 2-hop address duplication.
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In figure 2, X (gray) spoofs the identity of x (white), i.e. a and c both
receive HELLOs from a router identifying as x. For b, a and c present the same
neighbor sets, and are equal candidates for MPR selection. If b selects only a as
MPR, c will not relay flooded traffic from or transiting via b, and the (white)
router x (and routers to the “right” of it) will not receive flooded traffic.
2.1.2 Flooding Disruption due to Link Spoofing
In the network in figure 3, the malicious router X spoofs links to the existing
router c, as well as to a fictitious w. a receives HELLOs from X and b, reporting
X:{X-c, X-w}, b:{b-c}. All else being equal, X appears a better choice as MPR
than b, as X appears to cover all neighbors of b, plus w.
b Xa
c
w
cd
s
Figure 3: Link Spoofing: Flooding Disruption
As a will not select b as MPR, b will not relay flooded messages received
from a. The routers left of b (starting with c) will, thus, not receive any flooded
messages from or transiting a (e.g. a message originating from s).
2.2 Radio Jamming
Radio Jamming is an attack, in which access to the communication channel
between routers is hindered by, e.g., a powerful transmitter is generating “white
noise” on the channel. Due to the ease of access to the channel, this is partic-
ularly possible in wireless networks. Jamming affects reception, thus interfaces
on a “jammed” channel are unable to receive HELLO and TCs. Depending on
lower layers, this may not affect transmissions: HELLOs and TCs from a router
with “jammed” interfaces may be received by other routers. As the Neighbor-
hood Discovery process of OLSRv2 identifies and uses only bi-directional links
for the Link State Advertisement process, a link from a jammed router to a
non-jammed router would not be considered, and the jammed router appear
simply as “disconnected” for the un-jammed part of the network – which is able
to maintain accurate topology maps.
3 Effective Topology
Link-state protocols assume that each router can acquire an accurate topology
map, reflecting the effective network topology. This implies that the routing
protocol, through its message exchange, identifies a path from a source to a
destination, and this path is valid for forwarding data traffic.
INRIA
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3.1 Incorrect Forwarding
In OLSRv2, routers send TCs and HELLOs using link-local transmissions;
the routing process in each router retransmits received messages, destined for
network-wide diffusion. If the router is not configured to enable forwarding, this
will not affect acquisition of a topology map by the routing protocol – but will
cause a discrepancy between the effective topology and the topology map.
3.2 Wormholes
A wormhole, depicted in the example in figure 4, may be established between
two collaborating devices, connected by an out-of-band channel; these devices
send traffic through the “tunnel” to their alter-ego, which “replays” the traffic.
Thus, router d and router s appear as-if direct neighbors and reachable from
each other in 1 hop through the tunnel, with the path through the MANET
being 100 hops long.
s d
100 hop long path
1 hop long path via "wormhole"
Figure 4: Wormholing between two collaborating devices not participating in
the routing protocol, “tunneling” traffic between s and d over an “out-of-band”
channel.
The impact of a wormhole depends on its detailed behavior. If the worm-
hole relays control traffic, but not data traffic, the considerations in section 3.1
applies. If it relays control and data traffic alike, it is identical to a usable link:
the routing protocol will generate a topology map reflecting this as the effective
network topology. The efficiency of the topology so obtained depends on (i)
the wormhole characteristics, (ii) how the wormhole presents itself and (iii) how
paths are calculated. If the cost of the wormhole “link” represents the actual
cost of transit, then the wormhole may in the worst case cause no degradation
in performance, in the best case improve performance by offering a better path.
If the wormhole “misrepresents” the cost of transit, then the presence of the
wormhole results in a degradation in performance as compared to using the
non-wormhole path. Conversely, if the “link” presented by the wormhole has
better characteristics, the wormhole results in improved performance.
An additional consideration with regards to wormholes is, that it may be
undesirable to have data traffic transit such a path: an attacker could, by in-
troducing a wormhole, acquire the ability to record and inspect transiting data
traffic.
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3.3 Sequence Number Attacks
OLSRv2 uses two different sequence numbers in TCs, to (i) avoid processing and
forwarding the same message more than once (Message Sequence Number), and
(ii) to ensure that old information, arriving late due to e.g. long paths other
delays, is not allowed to overwrite fresher information (Advertised Neighbor
Sequence Number – ANSN).
For (i), an attack may consist of a malicious router spoofing the identity of
another router in the network, and transmitting a large number of TCs, each
with different Message Sequence Numbers. Subsequent TCs with the same se-
quence numbers, originating from the router whose identity was spoofed, would
thence be ignored, until eventually information concerning these “spoofed” TC
messages expires.
For (ii), an attack may consist of a malicious router spoofing the identity of
another router in the network, and transmitting a single TC, with an ANSN sig-
nificantly larger than that which was last used by the legitimate router. Routers
will retain this larger ANSN as “the most fresh information” and discard sub-
sequent TCs with lower sequence numbers as being “old”.
3.4 Message Timing Attacks
In OLSRv2, each control message may contain “validity time” and “interval
time” fields, identifying the time for which information in that control message
should be considered valid until discarded, and the time until the next control
message of the same type should be expected [11].
3.4.1 Interval Time Attack
A use of the expected interval between two successive HELLO messages is for
determining the link quality in Neighbor Discovery process, as described in [7]:
if messages are not received with the expected intervals (e.g. a certain fraction
of messages are missing), then this may be used to exclude a link from being
considered as useful, even if (some) bi-directional communication has been veri-
fied. If a malicious router X spoofs the identity of an existing router a, and sends
HELLOs indicating a very low interval time, a router b receiving this HELLO
will expect the following HELLO to arrive within the interval time indicated –
or otherwise, decrease the link quality for the link a-b. Thus, X may cause b’s
estimate of the link quality for the link a-b to fall below the limit, where it is
no longer considered as useful and, thus, not used.
3.4.2 Validity Time Attack
A malicious router, X, can spoof the identity of a router a and send a HELLO
using a very low validity time (e.g. 1 ms). A receiving router b will discard the
information upon expiration of that interval, i.e. a link between router a and b
will be “torn down” by X.
3.5 Indirect Jamming
Indirect Jamming is when a malicious router X by its actions causes legitimate
routers to generate inordinate amounts of control traffic. This increases channel
INRIA
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occupation, and the overhead in each receiving router processing this control
traffic. With this traffic originating from legitimate routers, the malicious device
may remain undetected to the wider network.
3.5.1 Indirect Jamming: Neighborhood Discovery
Figure 5 illustrates indirect jamming of the Neighborhood Discovery process.
A malicious router X advertises a symmetric spoofed link to the non-existing
router b (at time t0). a selects X as MPR upon reception of the HELLO, and
will trigger a HELLO at t1. Overhearing this triggered HELLO, the attacker
sends another HELLO at t2, advertising the link to b as lost, which leads to
router a deselecting the attacker as MPR, and another triggered message at t4.
The cycle may be repeated, alternating advertising the link X-b as LOST and
SYM.
a
X
t0
Indicate b 
as SYM
X
t1
MPRs: (X)
a a
X
t2
Indicate b
as LOST
X
t3
MPRs: ()
a
b b
Figure 5: Indirect Jamming in Neighborhood Discovery
Indirect Jamming of the Neighborhood Discovery process will cause addi-
tional MPR set calculations; are “triggered HELLOs” enabled, an increased
HELLO frequency occurs.
3.5.2 Indirect Jamming: Link State Advertisement
Similar to 3.5.1, figure 6 illustrates indirect jamming of the Link State Adver-
tisement process. A malicious router X may “flip” between selecting a as MPR,
and between advertising the link a-X as lost. This leads a to update its set
of advertised neighbors (as the MPR Selector Set of a changes), increase the
corresponding ANSN, and advertise this in a subsequent TC – which X uses to
trigger another “status flip”.
Each such TC with an updated ANSN causes all routers in the network to
recalculate their routing tables; are “triggered TCs” enabled, an increased TC
frequency occurs.
RR n° 7203
10 T. Clausen, U. Herberg
a
X
t0
Select as 
MPR
X
t1
TC: (X-a)
       ANSN
a
ANS={X}
ANSN++
a
X
t2
Indicate as
LOST
X
t3
TC: ()
       ANSN
a
ANS={}
ANSN++
Figure 6: Indirect Jamming in Link State Advertisement
4 Inconsistent Topology
Inconsistent topology maps can occur by a malicious router employing either of
identity spoofing or link spoofing for conducting an attack against an OLSRv2
network.
4.1 Identity spoofing
Identity spoofing can be employed by a malicious router via the Neighborhood
Discovery process and via the Link State Advertisement process; either of which
causing inconsistent topology maps in routers in the network.
4.1.1 Inconsistent Topology Maps due to Neighborhood Discovery
In order to minimize the risk of detection, the malicious router (gray circle) in
figure 7 elects to not participate in the Link State Advertisement procedure,
thus it does not select any MPRs and does not accept being elected as MPR
(by advertising a willingness of zero). By not participating in the Link State
Advertisement process, its presence is known only to c, d and e. X elects to
spoof the identity of a, b, f and g, i.e. no routers whose identity it spoofs will
not receive control messages allowing them to detect that these identities are
also advertised elsewhere in the network. Traffic transiting d, from either side,
to destination a, b, f and g will, rather than being forwarded to the intended
destination, be delivered to the malicious router. Traffic transiting c with b as
destination, will be delivered to the intended b. Traffic transiting c with a as
destination may be delivered to the intended a via b or to the malicious router
via d – as the paths are of equal length.
In figure 7, c is the only router receiving control traffic indicating two topo-
logic locations of the identities a, b. However this is not an unusual situation: a
valid link might indeed exist between routers a and d as well as between routers
b and d, e.g. through another channel. This creates a situation wherein two
or more routers have inconsistent topology maps: traffic for an identified desti-
nation is, depending on where in the network it appears, delivered to different
routers.
INRIA
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a b dc e f g
X
spoofs: a, b, f, g
Figure 7: Identity Spoofing: maximizing disruptive impact while minimizing
risk of detection.
4.1.2 Inconsistent Topology Maps due to Link State Advertisements
An inconsistent topology map may also occur when the malicious router takes
part in the Link State Advertisement process: spoofing an identity and selecting
MPRs causes a link to the spoofed identities of the malicious router to be
advertised through the network.
c Xfb eda
spoofs a
Figure 8: Identity Spoofing due to Link State Advertisements
In figure 8, the malicious router X spoofs the address of a. If X selects f as
MPR, all routers in the network will be informed about the link f-a by way the
TCs originating from f. Assuming that (the real) a selects b as MPR, the link
b-a will also be advertised through the network.
b and c will calculate paths to a via b. e and f will calculate paths to a via
f – i.e. through the malicious router X. e and f are thus disconnected from the
real a. d will have the choice of selecting a path in to a in either direction.
In general, the following observations can be made: (i) the network will be
split in two, with those routers closer to b than to X reaching a, and those
routers closer to X than to b will be unable to reach a; (ii) routers beyond b,
i.e. routers beyond one hop away from a will be unable to detect this identity
spoofing.
The impact of combining identity spoofing with Link State Advertisements is
greater than the impact of section 4.1.1, as it causes alterations to the topology
maps of all routers in the network. The attack is also easier to detect: with
the malicious router advertised through the network, routers whose identities
spoofed can detect this. When a receives a TC message from f advertising the
link f-a, it can deduce that “something is wrong” as a does not have f recorded
as a direct neighbor.
4.2 Link Spoofing
Link spoofing can be employed by a malicious router via the Neighborhood
Discovery process and via the Link State Advertisement process; either of which
causing inconsistent topology maps in routers in the network.
RR n° 7203
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4.2.1 Inconsistent Topology Maps due to Neighborhood Discovery
The malicious router X in figure 3 spoofs two links to c and w. Consequently, a
selects X as its sole MPR – and therefore router X is the sole router expected
to advertise links to a. s selects a as MPR, thus a is expected to advertise the
link a-S through the network, i.e. using the MPR flooding process.
The topology maps acquired by the various routers in this example are:
• a and b: accurate topology map due to the Neighborhood Discovery
process providing topological information up to 2 hops away.
• c: as in figure 9(a). Link state advertisements from a are not forwarded
by b. Existence of s and the link a-s is not known beyond b. Existence of
a and the link b-a and is known to b through the Neighborhood Discovery
process.
• d and beyond: as illustrated in figure 9(b).
• s: accurate Topology Map corresponding to the network in figure 3. This
may contain the dotted routers c and w, only if X participates in the Link
State Advertisement process (section 4.2.2).
b acd
(a) Inconsistent Topology Map in
router c.
bcd
(b) Inconsistent Topology
Map in routers d and be-
yond.
Figure 9: Perceived Topology Maps with malicious router X performing Link
Spoofing in the Neighborhood Discovery Process.
4.2.2 Inconsistent Topology Maps due to Link State Advertisements
The malicious router X in figure 10 spoofs links to the existing a, by participat-
ing in the Link State Advertisement process and including the link X-a in its
advertisements.
c Xf ab ed ga
Figure 10: Link Spoofing: The malicious router X advertises a spoofed link
to router a in its TC messages, thus all routers will record the links X-a and
b-a.
As TC messages are flooded through the network, all routers will receive and
record information describing the link X-a. If a has selected b as MPR, a will
likewise flood this link state information through the network, and all routers
will receive and record information describing a link b-a.
Routers b, c and d will calculate a shortest path via a different router than
routers f and g, thus leading to network split in two. This is similar to the
INRIA
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impact of section 4.1.2, and when a receives a TC message from X advertising
the link X-a, it can likewise deduce that “something is wrong” as a does not
have X recorded as a direct neighbor.
5 Vulnerability Summary
Table 1 summarizes the vulnerabilities in OLSRv2, as presented in this paper.
For each, a note indicates if OLSRv2 provides some inherent resilience; further
discussion of the resilience of OLSRv2 is given in section 6.
Attack Section OLSRv2 Resilience?
Topology Map Acquisition
Flooding disruption 2.1 None
Radio Jamming 2.2 Partly: Considers only bidi-
rectional links
Effective Topology
Incorrect Forwarding 3.1 None
Wormholes 3.2 none
Sequence Numbers 3.3 Partly: rejecting “old” mes-
sages
Message Timing 3.4 None
Indirect Jamming 3.5 Yes: minimum and maxi-
mum intervals
Inconsistent Topology
Identity Spoofing 4.1 None
Link Spoofing 4.2 None
Table 1: Vulnerability Summary of OLSRv2
6 Inherent OLSRv2 Resilience
While OLSRv2 does not specifically include security features (such as encryp-
tion), it has some inherent resilience against part of the attacks described in
this paper. In particular, it provides the following resilience:
• Sequence numbers: OLSRv2 employs message sequence numbers, specific
per router identity and message type. Routers keep an “information fresh-
ness” number (ANSN), incremented each time the content of a Link State
Advertisement from a router changes. This allows rejecting “old” informa-
tion and duplicate messages, and provides some protection against “mes-
sage replay”. This also presents an attack vector (section 3.3).
• Ignoring uni-directional links: The Neighborhood Discovery process de-
tects and admits only bi-directional links for use in MPR selection and
Link State Advertisement. Jamming attacks (section 2.2) may affect only
reception of control traffic, however OLSRv2 will correctly recognize, and
ignore, such a link as not bi-directional.
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• Message interval bounds: The frequency of control messages, with mini-
mum intervals imposed for HELLO and TCs. This may limit the impact
from an indirect jamming attack (section 3.5).
• Additional reasons for rejecting control messages: The OLSRv2 specifi-
cation includes a list of reasons, for which an incoming control message
should be rejected as malformed – and allows that a protocol extension
may recognize additional reasons for OLSRv2 to consider a message mal-
formed. This allows – together with the flexible message format [9] –
addition of security mechanisms, such as digital signatures, while remain-
ing compliant with the OLSRv2 standard specification.
7 Conclusion
This paper has presented a detailed analysis of security threats to the Optimized
Link State Routing Protocol version 2 (OLSRv2), by taking an abstract look
at the algorithms and message exchanges that constitute the protocol, and for
each protocol element identifying the possible vulnerabilities and how these can
be exploited. In particular, as link-state protocol, OLSRv2 assumes that (i)
each router can acquire and maintain a topology map, accurately reflecting
the effective network topology; and (ii) that the network converges, i.e. that
all routers in the network will have sufficiently identical (consistent) topology
maps. An OLSRv2 network can be effectively disrupted by breaking either of
these assumptions, specifically (a) routers may be prevented from acquiring a
topology map of the network; (b) routers may acquire a topology map, which
does not reflect the effective network topology; and (c) two or more routers may
acquire substantially inconsistent topology maps.
The disruptive attacks to OLSRv2, presented in this paper, are classified in
either of these categories. For each, it is demonstrated, whether OLSRv2 has
an inherent protection against the attack.
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